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Abstract 
Post-transaction marketing offers are often designed to trick consumers into purchasing products they 
would not want. To increase the frequency of transactions, retailers use strategies such as subscribing 
consumers by default to offers, camouflaging post-transaction offers as part of primary transactions, 
and being unclear about the terms of the offer. Further, sharing agreements for personal consumer 
data and payment credentials between first and third-party retailers violate consumers’ expectations 
about privacy and business conduct. Some of these tactics have been mitigated in the United States 
with the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA). In this paper, we report the results from 
an online post-transaction marketing experiment. We involve over 500 consumers in a purchasing 
episode (i.e., a functional mock-up music store) followed by a post-transaction marketing offer with 
low value to consumers. In the experiment, we systematically vary important design characteristics on 
the offer page, and collect additional data through a post-experimental questionnaire. We investigate 
which factors are most predictive of acceptance of the low-value post-transaction offer. We find that 
ROSCA’s interventions are a step in the right direction and should be considered by European 
regulators, but do not go far enough.   
Keywords: Post-Transaction Offer Marketing, Online Experiment, Computer-Human Interaction, 
Protection of Personal Information. 
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1 Introduction 
Post-transaction marketing offers are presented to consumers after they have successfully concluded a 
primary purchase. The objective is to encourage an additional transaction with the consumer and not 
merely to advertise a different product. In principle, such practices can be part of the normal and 
broadly acceptable interactions between businesses and consumers, in particular, if the offered 
products and services are sufficiently related to the primary purchase and will likely appeal to 
consumers. 
Unfortunately, many examples of post-transaction marketing have to be considered potentially 
deceptive and misleading according to the definition given by the Federal Trade Commission Policy 
Statement on Deception (FTC, 1984). In fact, until 2008, the FTC brought cases against over 300 
companies and individuals (Ballaré and Von Bergen, 2008) for practices that are “likely to mislead 
the…reasonable consumer” (FTC, 1984). To investigate the extent of such practices, the U.S. Senate 
compiled a report that detailed how nearly 4 million customers were enrolled in programs that had 
been sold as potentially deceptive post-transaction offers in 2009, and over 35 million consumers were 
affected in the previous 10-year period. Even more worrisome, 99% of the affected consumers (that 
were surveyed for the report) had never used the product, were typically unaware of having purchased 
the product, and were accordingly not satisfied with their purchase (U.S. Senate, 2009). 
In most investigated cases, post-transaction marketing offers were provided by third-party entities that 
formed a profit-sharing relationship with well-known businesses. Under the terms of these business 
relationships, a consumer would be automatically redirected to a third-party site after the conclusion of 
the primary purchase. However, consumers likely did not realize that such a redirection had taken 
place and believed that the post-transaction marketing page was merely a continuation of the check-
out process (Edelman, 2009). 
In addition, the investigated business relationships involved different degrees of sharing of consumer 
data and payment credentials between the primary merchant (who collected the data from the 
consumer) and the third party (which had in most cases no previous relationship with the affected 
consumer). The information was used to pre-populate the post-transaction offer with personal 
information and payment details to lower the bar for agreement to the offer. However, these so-called 
data-pass arrangements violated consumers’ expectations about data protection and data privacy, and 
about the typical treatment of consumer information during electronic commerce transactions 
(Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005; Turow et al., 2007). Further, data-pass also contributed to the 
mistaken assumption by consumers that the primary transaction was still ongoing (Edelman, 2009). 
In response to these findings, U.S. Congress passed the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act 
(ROSCA, 2010). ROSCA prohibits post-transaction offers unless they “clearly and conspicuously 
disclose all…terms of the transaction,” which include a description of what the offer is, its price, and 
the involved parties. To charge consumers, merchants are compelled to ensure consumers “perform an 
additional affirmative action such as clicking on a confirmation button or checking a box that 
indicates…consent to be charged.” Accordingly, ROSCA outlaws the most aggressive forms of post-
transaction marketing in which consumers were presumed to have agreed to the offer by default (and 
in some cases did not even have an option to cancel the order on the post-transaction marketing site). 
However, it remains unclear whether the restrictions compelled by ROSCA significantly lower the 
likelihood that consumers will fall for offers that they do not want and do not need. 
To the best of our knowledge, we report the first comprehensive experimental study that investigates 
consumers’ response to post-transaction marketing offers. We developed a plausible primary online 
shopping scenario and a related post-transaction marketing offer that we anticipated to have very low 
value to an average consumer. Further, decisions in the experiment had actual payoff consequences for 
the participants. 
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In our study, we systematically vary three important design dimensions that are relevant in the context 
of post-transactions marketing. First, we investigate the impact of different default regimes for 
agreement to the offer. We consider opt-in and opt-out mechanisms, i.e., in the latter case the 
participant has to take affirmative action when she does not want to accept the offer. Second, we study 
different data protection scenarios. That is, we compare experimentally an arrangement with data-pass 
and a scenario in which the participant has to enter her information on the post-transaction page 
herself. Third, we investigate how the visibility of data-pass arrangements impacts consumer 
behaviour, i.e., we also study scenarios in which data is shared with the third party; however, the 
shared information is not made visible on the post-transaction marketing page. The results of our study 
allow for a discussion of the positive impact and the limitations of ROSCA and similar legislation, and 
shed light at the complex task to protect consumers from aggressive online marketing practices which 
violate data protection expectations in unanticipated ways. 
In Section 2, we provide additional background information about post-transaction marketing and 
review related work. In Section 3, we present our experimental methodology. Section 4 contains the 
analysis of the experimental data. In Section 5, we discuss the results and offer concluding remarks. 
2 Background 
2.1 Post-Transaction Marketing in Practice 
Post-transaction marketing sales are driven by a mixture of factors that may include “data pass” 
arrangements (i.e., payment credentials are automatically transferred between partners and are not re-
entered by the consumer), “free-to-pay” conversions (i.e., free trial offers that without additional 
consumer interactions result in payments), “negative options” (i.e., perpetual membership that causes 
periodic payments without further notice), and “diffusion” (e.g., obstructions on the ability of 
consumers to identify the relevant parties). Users severely struggle with the powerful combination of 
these factors (Cox, 2010; U.S. Senate, 2009). 
Senate Committee hearings in 2009 showed that research conducted in other contexts exists to 
highlight aspects of the problem, for example, from a readability or high level consumer decision-
making perspective (U.S. Senate, 2009). Further, prominent researchers in information design have 
recognized many related problematic issues such as the intentional masking of substantive content 
(e.g., Tufte, 1997). However, we are unaware of research that systematically studies these issues 
within the specific context of post-transaction marketing or sufficiently related areas to formulate 
appropriate public policy responses, to design user support tools, and to educate consumers to 
implement their genuine desires in the marketplace. Our assessment is supported by comprehensive 
review efforts in marketing and decision making (Boush et al., 2009; Milkman et al., 2009).  
In our online experiment, we research several (but not all) characteristics of post-transaction 
marketing. In particular, we systematically vary the process and visibility of data pass arrangements, 
and the process of gaining user consent (e.g., opt-in/opt-out). We keep a consistent level of diffusion 
across our experimental treatments and use a design of the post-transaction marketing that is derived 
from legal cases (e.g. the Intelius case; see Johnson 2010). The experiment is situated in an actual 
purchasing situation with monetary consequences to the participants. Altogether, the experimental 
setup is conducive to provide actionable insights for the public policy process and to yield input for 
the development of best-practice marketing activities. 
2.2 Online Notice and Consent 
Our study is influenced by online notice and consent research. Most post-transaction marketing 
schemes typically disclose the most relevant terms, though the ways that they do so are usually 
unexpected and difficult to comprehend for an average consumer. Similarly, other types of online 
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notices and most privacy policies present complex legal information that most consumers find 
impenetrable, or at the very least user-unfriendly. 
Research shows that complexity of privacy notices hampers users’ ability to understand such 
agreements. For example, Jensen and Potts (2004) studied a sample of 64 privacy policies from high 
traffic and health care websites. They found that policies’ format, location on the website and legal 
content severely limit users’ ability to make informed decisions. Good et al. (2007) conducted an 
experiment in which they presented a carefully developed short-notice before or after an installation 
choice. The availability of this more concise information reduced the occurrence of installations of 
problematic programs (compared to a control treatment of a standard notice). Somewhat surprisingly, 
even in the presence of short notices many users installed programs that disclosed potentially harmful 
privacy and security practices, but soon afterwards they regretted their actions. Similarly, 
Spiekermann et al. (2001) showed that behaviour is not responsive to different disclosures about 
privacy practices. In a shopping experiment, they presented two different privacy statements to 
consumers. In one treatment, consumers were reminded of the shelter provided by EU data protection 
regulations. In the other treatment, consumers were presented with a harsh privacy notice suggesting 
that data would be sold to a third party and no protection would be provided. The researchers observed 
no behavioural difference between the treatments. The researchers also found that privacy preferences 
are a somewhat consistent predictor for revealed privacy behaviours, but that even privacy 
fundamentalists reveal an unexpectedly large amount of personal information when involved in 
engaging shopping tasks (Spiekermann et al., 2001). 
The academic literature on online notice and consent and the lessons-learned from self-regulatory and 
governmental efforts to improve the status quo are substantial (Smith et al., 2011), but ultimately 
inconclusive to our context. Specifically, to the best of our knowledge, no study exists that directly 
explores the context of post-transaction marketing or negative options practices.  
2.3 Opt-In and Opt-Out Options 
Our study touches upon several dimensions of computer-human interaction research. In particular, we 
want to highlight the work on opt-in and opt-out mechanisms. When considering post-transaction 
marketing offers, an inappropriate opt-in or opt-out design may contribute to consumers making 
decisions that they later regret.  
Different organizations hold different attitudes towards these two approaches. Since the European 
Union (EU) Data Directive of 1995, European law requires that opt-in choices must be used for 
consumer protection. The more recent E-Privacy Directive, suggests that information to a user’s data 
can only be gained if the “user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with 
clear and comprehensive information… about the purposes of the processing (European Union, 
2009).” However, it is unclear to which degree these regulations apply to post-transaction marketing 
(in which the consumer has already agreed to share data during a primary transaction). In contrast, 
industry organizations such as the Direct Marketing Association recommend an opt-out procedure 
(Direct Marketing Association, 2002). 
Previous e-commerce studies have shown opt-in and opt-out mechanisms have a significant impact on 
users’ participation in online activities (Lai and Hui, 2006; Staten and Cate, 2003). From the service 
providers’ point of view, Staten and Cate pointed out that opt-in strategies would raise company’s cost 
and lower profits (Staten and Cate, 2003). Such procedures may also generate more unneeded offers to 
uninterested or unqualified consumers, and raise the number of missed opportunities for interested 
consumers. From the consumers’ point of view, Lai and Hui studied how frames, defaults, and privacy 
concerns impact users’ online newsletter subscription behaviours. They found that opt-in approaches 
result in lower levels of participation than opt-out approaches (Lai and Hui, 2006).  
To the best of our knowledge, we are unaware of any empirical evaluations of the default opt-in/opt-
out settings with respect to post-transaction marketing. While the e-commerce studies on the effects of 
opt-in and opt-out mechanisms are relevant to our study, we note that in our scenario the resulting 
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trade-offs are more complex. For legitimate e-commerce activities, the goal is to increase user 
participation and the amount of personal data being shared. However, from a consumer and regulatory 
perspective, as well as from the viewpoint of legitimate businesses, the prevalence of misleading 
marketing practices undermines trust in e-commerce and might have a negative long-term sales 
impact.  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
This study was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), which is a platform that connects 
requesters of services (e.g., researchers) with individuals willing to perform tasks. Experiments on 
AMT are able to reach a large number of potential subjects in a relatively short period of time, for a 
cost comparatively lower than traditional laboratory studies (Nochenson and Grossklags, 2013).  
AMT has been used for academic studies ranging from economics (Horton et al., 2011) to cognitive 
decision-making (Reitter et al., 2013). While AMT was originally intended to perform tasks that were 
difficult to automate (e.g. translation; see Callison-Burch, 2009), the service has since gained 
popularity and is commonplace in behavioural research including privacy and security studies. For 
example, Sheng et al. (2010) investigated susceptibility to email-based phishing schemes, Christin et 
al. (2012) studied individuals’ willingness to engage in unsafe online behaviours in exchange for 
payments, Wang et al. (2013) and Xu et al. (2012) researched how users engage with privacy 
configuration interfaces when installing social applications. Further, despite concerns about the 
validity of using AMT for research studies, it has been shown that AMT participants “produce reliable 
results consistent with standard decision-making biases” (Goodman et al., 2012). 
Our AMT study setup required participants to be from the United States and to have an approval rate 
of at least 85% for previously completed tasks. These restrictions were put in place in order to ensure 
quality and relevance to ecommerce practices in Western countries (Mason and Suri, 2012; Ross et al., 
2010; Ipeirotis, 2010).  
3.2 Experimental Setup and Sequence 
For this study, we created an artificial music store entitled MelodiesFor.Us and registered the same 
domain name.  The sequence of the experiment was as follows: 
1. On AMT, potential participants could view basic information about the study on “music purchasing 
behaviors” and were able to “accept” the task. Participants were then presented with a consent form 
(per the University IRB) detailing, for example, the payment structure. The consent form did not 
detail the exact procedure that each potential participant was to encounter; since that would have 
compromised the study (i.e., informing them about the post-transaction offer would render our 
interventions superfluous). 
2. After acceptance, participants were directed to an instruction screen, which explained to 
participants that they were to enter a music store, and that they would receive $1.50 to purchase a 
song (at the cost of $0.99). They were instructed that “any transaction in the shopping environment 
reduced your starting budget as described in the shopping environment” and that they would 
receive any leftover funds from their budgets at conclusion of the experiment.   
3. Participants were then directed to the music store (Figure 1). Participants could view and sample 
six different songs. Participants had to add one song to their cart to continue the experiment. 
4. Participants were then shown a checkout page that requested additional information for purchase 
confirmation. This page requested their AMT ID, age, zip code, and email. Participants then 
confirmed the purchase of the song. 
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5. Participants were then presented with the post-transaction offer screen offering a product called 
“SafeDelivery” (Figure 2). If, based on the choices on this screen, a participant purchased the 
product then their endowment was reduced by $0.50 leaving $0.01 of their initial budget.  
6. After the post-transaction offer screen, participants were asked to complete a survey. 
7. When participants successfully completed the survey, they were shown a task completion message, 
and were instructed to indicate as such in the AMT interface to receive payment. 
3.3 Payment Structure: Participation Fee and Bonus Payment 
In accordance with experiments in the experimental economics tradition, participants were 
compensated with a participation fee and a bonus payment based on their performance (Grossklags, 
2007). The participation fee for participants was $0.50, which they earned for completing all parts of 
the experiment. Participants that did not complete all parts of the experiment were not compensated. 
However, participants could end the study at any time, if they did not wish to continue. 
For the experiment, participants were given a budget of $1.50 (separate from the participation fee) to 
purchase one song for $0.99. After the music purchase, participants were redirected to the post-
transaction offer. If participants did not purchase the offer, they were paid as a bonus their remaining 
endowment ($0.51). If they did purchase the post-transaction offer, their budget was reduced by the 
cost of the service ($0.50) and they were paid the remaining $0.01 as a bonus. 
3.4 SafeDelivery (Post-Transaction Offer) 
SafeDelivery is a mock service that we designed as a post-transaction marketing offer. The layout of 
the offer page was specifically designed to look similar, but not identical to, the rest of the 
MelodiesFor.us site. The consistency in interface likely increases the perceived trustworthiness of the 
post-transaction offer (Edelman, 2009). The offer page includes wording that is somewhat difficult-to-
comprehend. It offers a “50% discount” on another copy of the song (i.e., for $0.50 extra, participants 
would receive a second copy of initially purchased song). The offer is designed so that the inattentive 
participant could mistake the discounted additional product for a discount on the original purchase. 
3.5 Treatments 
We designed six treatment conditions that were all expressed on the post-transaction page and which 
represent three different design choices which could be mandated by law or self-regulation (and are 
partly responsive to ROSCA). The treatments are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Treatment Opt-in/out Email pre-
populated? 
T1 In Yes 
T2 Out Yes 
T3 In No 
T4 Out No 
T5 In Yes-hidden 
T6 Out Yes-hidden 
Table 1.  Treatments and their properties. 
As a first design choice, we test the impact of post-transaction offers that are opt-in against those that 
are opt-out. That is, the treatments were partitioned into half opt-in and half opt-out (i.e., three 
treatments each). In treatments that were opt-in, participants were required to hit a large button to opt 
into the purchase of SafeDelivery (costing $0.50), while in those that were opt-out, participants were 
required to hit the same large button (with different text) to opt out of the purchase; see Figure 3.  
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Particularly relevant for our study, on the “checkout” page participants had to enter their email 
address, zip code, age, and AMT ID. 10% of all participants apparently chose not to provide this 
information, and instead left the task (Table 2). Presumably, the solicitation of their information 
caused participants to make a conscious privacy choice.  
 
Last page # of Participants 
(%) 
Consent form 4     (0.5%) 
Instructions 2     (0.3%) 
Music shopping  15   (2%) 
Checkout song 77   (10%) 
Post transaction offer 56   (8%) 
Post survey 26   (4%) 
Finished 550 (74%) 
Table 2. Attrition rates by page. 
Treatment # Drop on Post-transaction offer 
page  
(% of total drops) 
T1 8   (4.1%) 
T2 9   (4.7%) 
T3 5   (2.6%) 
T4 17 (8.9%) 
T5 7   (3.7%) 
T6 10 (5.2%) 
Table 3. Attrition rates by treatment on  
post-transaction offer page. 
 
We identified 12 participants (1.62%) that continued to the last page of the experiment but did not 
complete it correctly due to any number of potential technical difficulties. Those subjects have been 
removed from the analysis. 
 
4.1.1 Attrition by Treatment 
We examined attrition differences across treatments. We focus on the post-transaction offer page, 
since its design varied by treatment (Table 3). Participants in T3 (opt-in, not-pre-pop) had the lowest 
attrition rate, while participants in T4 (opt-out, no-pre-pop) had the highest. Since T3 is the least 
aggressive treatment (because it requires the most conscious intervention and is opt-in), it is 
unsurprising that is has the lowest attrition. Conversely, T4 is the most aggressive treatment (since it is 
opt-out and requires the most effortful action to opt-out) and has the most attrition.  
Attrition rates were also lower for treatments that were opt-in (T1, T3, T5) than for their opt-out 
counterparts (T2, T4, and T6, respectively). Since opt-in is the preferred way for websites to behave 
(as defined by policy makers and consumer advocates, and the legal way according to ROSCA), this 
result is not surprising. When faced with a choice that is unusual or potentially untrustworthy, it makes 
sense that participants are more likely to abandon the purchasing episode. Paradoxically, in practice, 
participants would remain signed up for the service since they did not actively opt-out.  
In the following subsections, analysis of this experiment will be restricted to those participants that 
successfully completed the experiment (i.e., 550 participants). 
4.2 Demographic Information 
For the 550 participants that finished the experiment, the mean age was 33 years old (ߪ ൌ 11	years). 
292 participants (53%) were female. Most participants had gained at least some college education. 
This demographic mix of participants was consistent with previously-completed surveys on the 
demographics of participants on AMT (Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton et al., 2011).  
4.3 Value of Post-Transaction Offer 
To address the problem area of potentially unwanted and deceptive post-transaction marketing, we 
aimed to simulate a situation where the post-transaction offer is of little or no value to participants. 
Therefore, the act of reducing the number of conversions can be understood as a socially optimal act.  
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To evaluate our study design, we investigated the perceptions of participants regarding the offer. As 
expected, 235 participants (43%) rated the offer’s value the lowest possible value on a 5-point Likert 
scale, and only 35 participants (6%) rated it the highest. The median value was 2. 
We found a strong linear relationship between how participants perceived the products’ value and 
whether they purchased it. Participants that rated the product very valuable (rating of 5) purchased it 
77% of the time, whereas participants that rated the product as a 3 purchased it 55% of the time, and 
those that rated the product a 1 purchased it 24% of the time. It is surprising that over 20% of the 
participants that thought the service was not at all valuable still purchased it. Similarly, Good et al. 
(2005 and 2007) found that installation decisions of potentially harmful programs where regretted 
immediately after installation and further reflection. 
4.4 Conversion Rates across all Treatments 
Treatments took different approaches to reduce the number of participants who purchased the post-
transaction offer (assuming that a purchase would be an undesirable outcome). Of the 550 participants 
that finished the experiment successfully, 222 participants (40%) purchased the post-transaction offer 
(across treatments). Treatments do have significantly different conversion rates (߯ଶ ൌ 51.6, ݌ ൏
0.0001); see Figure 4 and Table 4. 
 
Treatment Opt-in/out Email pre-populated? % Conversions (i.e., Email sent) 
(# convert/# total)
T1 In Yes 45.3%   (43/95) 
T2 Out Yes 44.4%   (40/90) 
T3 In No 18.7%   (17/91) 
T4 Out No 68.6%   (59/86) 
T5 In Yes-hidden 32.6%   (30/92) 
T6 Out Yes-hidden 34.4%   (33/96) 
Table 4.  Treatment details and their conversion rates. 
T3’s conversion rate is significantly lower than all other treatments (߯ଶ ൌ 20.2, ݌ ൏ 0.0001). This 
result was expected, since it featured the most effortful procedure to purchase the offered product. In 
order to agree to the post-transaction offer in this treatment, participants were required to manually 
enter their email address and hit the large button to confirm the purchase.  
The result is contrasted by a treatment with the perhaps most unexpected and potentially misleading 
procedure, i.e., T4. The treatment’s conversion rate is significantly higher than all other treatments 
(߯ଶ ൌ 32.4, ݌ ൏ 0.0001), because it required an increased effort to not purchase the offer. In this 
treatment, participants were set to agree to the post-transaction offer by default. To change this 
outcome, they were required to enter their email address and click the large button. Nearly 70% of the 
participants did not take these two actions, which left them with the default outcome. (Note that a 
popup box would notify the participants if they merely clicked the big button without entering their 
email address.) The size of the effect is perhaps surprising. However, we expected the general 
tendency of the result due to the increased effort to opt-out, and the fact that clicking “No thanks” 
means to stay with the default outcome (as stated in the disclosures on the post-transaction offer 
screen). The latter aspect was likely unexpected for participants who might have mistakenly presumed 
that “No thanks” would result in a cancelation of the purchase. This behaviour is, therefore, likely 
attributable to optimism biases and conditioned-response biases (Meyer, 2009). 
4.5 Opt-In versus Opt-Out 
When determining the effectiveness of opt-in and opt-out treatments, it is only reasonable to compare 
pairs of treatments that have all the same properties except for opt-in or opt-out status. Therefore, the 
pre-populated treatments T1 and T2 can be compared, the pre-populated and hidden information 
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thanks” button, presumably to cancel the post-transaction marketing purchase (even if it actually 
resulted in the opposite outcome). Note that these metrics are not complete mirror images. For opt-in 
treatments T1 and T3, “No thanks” is indeed the opposite of the conversion rate. However, for opt-out 
treatments T2 and T4, conversion rate and the number of times participants selected “No thanks” are 
the same. The two different perspectives make it easier to visually uncover the impact of conditioned 
response biases (Meyer, 2009), even if the underlying conversion rates are of course unchanged. 
Using the metric of conversion rate, experimental results show that data pass (simulated by a pre-filled 
box on the post-transaction offer page)  increases the conversion rate for treatments that present the 
offer as opt-in and decreases the conversion rate for treatments that present the offer as opt-out. 
Treatment  T1, which presents an opt-in offer using data pass, has a conversion rate which is more 
than twice as high as that of Treatment T3, which presents an opt-in offer without data pass (this 
relationship is significant; ܶ1 ൐ ܶ3;	߯ଶ ൌ 15.0, ݌ ൏ 0.001). Treatment T4, which presents the post-
transaction offer using data pass and an opt-out strategy, has a conversion rate over 50% higher than 
Treatment T2, which uses opt-out and does not use data pass (this relationship is significant; ܶ4 ൐
ܶ2;	߯ଶ ൌ 10.4, ݌ ൏ 0.01). 
Using the metric of “No thanks” rate, experimental results show that data pass leads fewer participants 
to select default options (Figure 5). In Treatment  T1, which presents an opt-in offer using data pass, 
fewer people select “No thanks” compared to Treatment T3, which presents an opt-in offer without 
data pass (this relationship is significant;	ܶ1 ൏ ܶ3;	߯ଶ ൌ 13.8, ݌ ൏ 0.001). Also in treatment T4, 
which presents the post-transaction offer using data pass and an opt-out strategy, fewer people select 
“No thanks” compared to Treatment T2, which uses opt-out and does not use data pass (this 
relationship is significant;	ܶ2 ൏ ܶ4; ߯ଶ ൌ 9.5, ݌ ൏ 0.01).  
The extra effort required to type an email address into a box reduces the number of participants who 
take this more effortful option regardless if that option is to opt in or to opt out. Likewise, by making it 
apparently less effortful to choose the “No thanks” option, consumers will do so, even to their own 
detriment. 
4.7 Consumer Knowledge of Data-Pass Arrangements 
The pre-populated and hidden information treatments T5 and T6 offer a different perspective on the 
privacy impact of post-transaction marketing. These treatments appear less like a privacy choice, since 
there is no active solicitation of information (i.e., of the participant’s email address) nor is there a clear 
indication that information is being transferred (i.e., a pre-populated box with personal data). 
Treatments T5 and T6, which do not disclose the use of data pass, have conversion rates that are 
around 25% lower than their counterpart treatments T1 and T2 (with the same opt-in and opt-out 
status), respectively. However, this difference is not significant; presumably due to lack of power. 
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this experiment, we tested consumers’ susceptibility to fall for costly post-transaction marketing 
offers that in return yield little-to-no value to the consumer. Of the 550 participants, over 40% signed 
up for the SafeDelivery product giving them access to a song (for an additional payment), that they 
had just purchased and downloaded a few seconds earlier in the MelodiesFor.Us store. It is difficult to 
argue that these purchases were wanted, and in fact in the post-experimental survey most consumers 
agreed that the service is not valuable. The monetary consequences of these unwanted purchases were 
considerable (i.e., 10%-40% of the average hourly wage of a typical AMT worker; Horton and 
Chilton, 2010). 
In our online experiment, we researched several (but not all) design characteristics of post-transaction 
marketing (Cox, 2010; U.S. Senate, 2009). We used a design for the post-transaction marketing offer 
that is derived from legal cases (e.g. the Intelius case; see Johnson 2010). Then, we systematically 
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varied the data pass arrangements and its visibility, and the process of gaining user consent (e.g., opt-
in/opt-out). We kept other user interface aspects constant across our experimental treatments. 
We collected sizeable samples for six experimental treatments that help to inform public policy and 
self-regulatory efforts by marketers and online businesses. For example, in the United States, the 
Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA) likely outlaws the opt-out treatments that were 
part of this experiment (i.e., Treatments 2, 4, and 6). Given our results, this policy direction appears 
partially effective. In each opt-out treatment, the same number of consumers or more purchased the 
post-transaction service compared to its opt-in counterpart. 
ROSCA also requires that the terms of the post-transaction offer be present before purchase. In our 
view, this requirement is insufficient. In this experiment, we did not omit material facts from the 
participants. However, the post-transaction offer was written in positive language, and pragmatically 
implied that SafeDelivery is a particularly useful service. In many jurisdictions, such “puffery” is 
usually discounted since consumers are thought to be able to identify exaggerations. We are 
unconvinced of this claim, in particular, when consumers have already completed a primary 
transaction and as a result are more likely to have positive perceptions about the shopping experience. 
Despite the visual dissimilarities between the shop/check-out pages and the post-transaction offer (and 
the order confirmation shown at the top of the page), many consumers had difficulty realizing that a 
second distinct transaction is taking place. For example, from our post-experimental survey, we 
learned that about 50% of the participants believed that SafeDelivery is the same company as 
MelodiesFor.Us, or they were unable to tell afterwards.  
ROSCA’s mandate that requires an effortful confirmation is moderately effective at reducing 
unwanted purchasing of post-transaction offers. The effect of this policy change is more substantial 
than the effect we observed from spending more time on the post-transaction marketing page (which 
presumably increases the likelihood of scrutinizing the offer in more detail).  
However, all effortful confirmations are not created equally. On the one hand, we found that 
participants that engaged with the most effortful confirmation to purchase a post-transaction offer (i.e., 
typing in their email and clicking a button) were the least likely to purchase the product. On the other 
hand, participants that needed to type in an email address to opt-out from the purchase were the least 
likely to do so, (again) due to the increased effort required. It is, therefore, imperative to pay special 
attention to opt-out regimes that require consumer effort. 
Surprisingly, participants that were presented with a pre-populated offer page were more likely to sign 
up for the service compared to the treatment where the email information was hidden from view. We 
believe that the visual presence of the email address served to reinforce the belief that the primary 
transaction was still in process. Such misleading inferences are likely a result of schematic thinking. 
I.e., the unusual interaction with the post-transaction marketing offer was insufficient to disrupt the 
schematic belief of being part of a “standard ecommerce” transaction (Alba & Hasher 1983; Harris & 
Monaco 1978). We also offer a different view. Consumers may interpret the post-transaction offer as a 
combination of a privacy sale (i.e., giving away their email address) and the SafeDelivery product. It is 
conceivable that the privacy aspect of the transaction distracts participants from a careful evaluation of 
the post-transaction offer page. Given the lower sign-up rate of the treatment where the email address 
is hidden, it might be prudent to recommend that privacy transactions should be treated separately 
from other transactional aspects. 
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